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Abstract: This study analyzes the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) associated with 
idiosyncratic risk. This study involved corporate governance (CG) in strengthening the negative relationship 
between CSR and idiosyncratic risk in the Indonesia Stock Exchange to analyze thoroughly. The main design is 
quantitative research with data processing method used the panel most miniature square regression model with 
imbalance data for the 2016-2019 period and 551 samples. The results proved that CSR significantly reduces 
idiosyncratic risk. CSR in the environmental dimension is proven to be more sensitive and robust in reducing 
idiosyncratic risk. Institutional ownership and independent commissioners strengthen the negative influence of CSR 
on idiosyncratic risk. The results showed support for the theory of risk management, signaling, and corporate 
governance mechanisms. The better the CSR performance, the company can manage its resources and give a 
positive signal to stakeholders because the monitoring mechanism has succeeded in suppressing idiosyncratic risk. 
This study can be seen from its novelty in relating CSR to idiosyncratic risk by involving a monitoring mechanism 
for emerging capital markets, namely the Indonesian Stock Exchange. There are still little researches on CSR 
related to monitoring mechanisms. In addition, researchers concentrated on the idiosyncratic risk because the 
company's policies drive it. 
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Several studies have focused on the economic 
implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
recent years. More than 80% of multinational 
companies have included CSR as a global management 
strategy to increase transparency [1]. Investor's 
confidence can be built upon environmental disclosure 
as the axis of CSR, which serves to identify risks 
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sustainably. CSR is considered a management 
insurance policy that serves as a safety tool to direct the 
focus of stakeholders in making decisions [2]. CSR 
itself functions as an information network for the 
community to convey the change in the business 
environment and the factors that drive this change [3]. 
Thus, CSR can transmit signals to meet investors' 
expectations of risk aversion [4]. 
CSR is very closely related to stakeholders since its 
image is mainly reflected in its caring activities for 
society. CSR requires a business that serves the needs 
of customers and other stakeholders in an 
environmentally and socially responsible manner and at 
the same time. Companies that are unable to meet the 
needs of stakeholders will have a degrading image, 
which can lead to various possible risks such as 
boycotts from customers, difficulties in obtaining 
resources, being rejected by the environment, 
disruption of operating activities, and fines from the 
government. Most stakeholders usually have a limited 
understanding of companies [1], so that companies are 
reluctant to be involved in CSR, which in turn hurts 
their operations and social development. This is a 
consequence of the high information asymmetry that 
limits the dissemination of quality information to 
external parties, namely stakeholders. 
Financial resources for CSR activities can be 
perceived as a profitable investment or as harmful 
waste. Mechanisms to overcome these problems 
require good corporate governance (CG) in 
implementing CSR. CG is used as a monitoring 
mechanism for the implementation of CSR. CG can be 
used to minimize conflicts of interest by determining 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities to all 
parties in the company [5]. There are three sources of 
agency problems. First, managers tend to demand not 
only luxury amenities but also the right to make 
strategic decisions. Second, the tendency of managers 
to make risky investments (over investment). Third, 
managers tend to minimize risk, which results in 
companies losing profitable investments 
(underinvestment). One of the characteristics of CG is 
the existence of institutional ownership, which is 
considered a function of the company's monitoring 
mechanism. This monitoring is expected to minimize 
the risks arising from agency conflicts. 
Several studies have focused on market risk as a 
risk that cannot be diversified. Meanwhile, the risk that 
can be diversified has received less attention, so that 
studies exploring idiosyncratic risk are still minimal. 
The question is, to minimize risk, can the company 
diversify its portfolio properly? In this study, the 
company risk being discussed is the idiosyncratic risk. 
Idiosyncratic risk will supposedly be reduced with the 
right decision, but managers have the flexibility to 
change the level of idiosyncratic risk through the 
selection of investment projects [6]. Several 
researchers with the idea that dependent decision-
making that benefits certain parties causes the 
idiosyncratic risk to increase [7] support this statement.  
This study analyzes CSR about idiosyncratic risk. 
This study involved CG to investigate monitoring 
mechanisms to strengthen the negative relationship 
between CSR and idiosyncratic risk to deepen the 
analysis. This study contributes in three ways. First, it 
can be seen from its novelty in relating CSR to 
idiosyncratic risk by involving a monitoring 
mechanism for emerging capital markets, namely the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. The existing phenomenon 
shows that information asymmetry in the Indonesian 
capital market is very high with a loose CG 
mechanism. Therefore, it is hoped that this research 
will help disclose company-specific risk reduction 
information as a basis for investment decisions. Several 
studies have concluded that information asymmetry can 
decrease if CSR is appropriately implemented and is 
negatively associated with risk [3,8]. 
In contrast to this condition, CSR disclosure can 
increase the cost of pollution reduction [1]. Second, 
there are still little researches on CSR related to 
monitoring mechanisms. Investments made by 
managers are allocated not only in profitable projects 
but also in unprofitable ones. Managers can use 
investments in CSR as encouragement for personal 
reasons that do not benefit the company. In this study, 
the specific monitoring mechanism appointed is 
institutional ownership and the proportion of 
independent commissioners. Institutional ownership 
and independent commissioners are considered to 
reduce top management's opportunistic actions [9]. 
Institutional investors and independent commissioners 
as active monitors can reduce agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry and avoid risks. Institutional 
investors have a vast network that provides funds and 
avoids financial difficulties [6]. 
This research is expected to contribute to corporate 
governance, risk management, and stakeholder theory. 
Good governance must uphold the principle of 
transparency to reduce the value of the idiosyncratic 
risk that can provide benefits for all investors. 
Stakeholder theory provides an overview of fair 
governance in achieving the company's main goal, 
namely maximizing company value. The manifestation 
of good governance is corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) to the environment as a company investment in 
reducing idiosyncratic risk, further maximizing 
company value. 
The practical contribution of the research is that it 
can provide knowledge to capital market participants in 
assessing the company's risk to avoid losses. The 
findings that are of concern to investors are monitoring 
mechanisms that support corporate governance. 
Companies that have monitors within the company but 
use external parties will make it easier for the company 
to be more optimal in monitoring because it interacts 
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directly with the company board, or the idiosyncratic 
risk can be reduced. 
The novelty given in this study is the use of an 
adopted approach in the form of a monitoring 
mechanism approach dimension that favors stakeholder 
theory, namely avoiding idiosyncratic risk. So far, the 
approach that has been relied on is an approach with a 
financial orientation that has not touched the 
idiosyncratic. The results of existing studies have 
ignored the idiosyncratic risk so that this study will be 
unique and have practical novelty. 
On the other hand, the professionalism possessed by 
institutional investors and independent commissioners 
can reduce the possibility of directors investing in CSR 
for personal reasons [6]. Companies that invest through 
CSR will improve their reputation to reduce tax 
payments and risks in the future [3]. Third, this study is 
also helpful in disclosing risk reduction information 
useful as a reference for decision-making. Many 
studies focus only on market risk, but many investors 
do not have a well-diversified portfolio and require 
high returns to bear the unique risk of stocks [10]. In 
other words, investors are currently paying attention to 
the specific risks of their securities, so that 
idiosyncratic risk still needs further investigation. In 
this study, researchers concentrated on the idiosyncratic 
risk because the company's policies drive it. Literature 
review and hypothesis building were described in 
section 2. Statistics, samples, and summaries were 
written in section 3. The results of the study and 
conclusions were respectively written in section 4 and 
section 5. 
 
2. The Background of Indonesian 
Institutions 
 
2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia 
CSR refers to the voluntary actions of companies 
that integrate the environment and society into 
business. In legitimacy theory, CSR is considered as 
part of the social contract. Furthermore, CSR can be a 
company guideline and strategy [11] to convey 
environmental responsibility and business risks [12]. In 
addition, stakeholder theory says that a business entity 
should function for its interests and provide 
contributions and benefits accountable to stakeholders. 
Companies have a strong incentive to maintain good 
relationships with various stakeholders through CSR 
[2]. 
The current global phenomenon, which also 
happens in Indonesia, is influenced by CSR. 
Companies must pay more attention to environmental 
and social aspects in the internal and external scope. 
One of the criteria for CSR typology is direct or 
indirect influence, namely the implementation of CSR 
in social activities whose implementation and benefits 
are felt directly or indirectly by the community. The 
number of companies implementing CSR shows that 
CSR implementation in Indonesia is increasing. CSR is 
implemented in various forms, including grants and 
empowerment [13]. In addition, its contribution can be 
seen from the print and electronic media, which show 
that CSR-related publications are increasingly exposed 
widely. The central and local governments, both the 
province and district or city, regulate the 
implementation of GCG in Indonesia. CSR practices 
are categorized into two implementation patterns from 
direct and indirect benefits and impacts on 
stakeholders: activities carried out simultaneously with 
the community, direct benefits to the community, and 
activities not carried out simultaneously with the 
community. However, the benefits can affect the 
community directly. 
Companies cannot be separated from their business 
environment when carrying out their operational 
activities. If the CSR program is defined as one of the 
strategic aspects of its operations, the implementation 
of the CSR program will be included in the operational 
costs. CSR activities can increase capital spending, 
improve energy efficiency, and meet regulatory 
requirements [1]. This means that the implementation 
of pollution reduction and energy efficiency can 
increase company financing. Nonetheless, CSR can be 
considered an investment strategy. Investors must be 
careful about spending their funds in the form of CSR 
because it can increase default risk [13]. In achieving 
its goals, companies must consider various 
stakeholders so that CSR can help reduce the risk of 
losing support from stakeholders [13]. 
 
2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
The risk of an investment is measured by the 
variance or standard deviation of the expected return. 
The bigger the spread, the higher the risk and the rate 
of return. Risk is formed by two components: risk, 
which can be diversified, and risk, which cannot be 
diversified. Thus, the total volatility of shares is formed 
from systematic volatility that is not diversified and 
idiosyncratic volatility that represents the uncertainty 
of a company. Idiosyncratic risk comes from deviations 
in the rate of return that the company can control. 
Idiosyncratic risks include company-specific problems 
such as equipment breakdowns, work strikes, natural 
disasters, and mismanagement. This risk is unique 
because it originates from a company with special 
characteristics according to its conditions. Investors 
will respond to this type of risk quickly through 
information published by the company. Since portfolio 
diversification can eliminate idiosyncratic volatility, the 
traditional asset-pricing model ignores this risk and 
only concentrates on market risk [14]. Idiosyncratic 
risk cannot be ignored, considering that managers can 
distort investment and financial policies through 
personal risk management. 
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In the financial economics literature, this 
diversifiable risk is known as idiosyncratic risk, unique 
and specific only for a company. Idiosyncratic risk 
affects the balance of stock prices when investors 
cannot make a well-diversified portfolio. In this 
condition, the risk that must be taken into account is 
the company's total risk, including the idiosyncratic 
risk. Thus, companies with a sizeable total variance 
(high idiosyncratic risk) will be required to have a high 
return to cover risks because the portfolio is not 
perfectly diversified [6]. Idiosyncratic risk is inversely 
proportional to portfolio returns [16], and increased 
risk encourages overvalued investors in assessing 
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. In facing market 
competition, the company's operational assessment 
includes CSR activities that create solid relationships 
with stakeholders [17], thereby reducing idiosyncratic 
risk. Companies that participate in CSR can effectively 
minimize their operational uncertainty and reduce 
idiosyncratic risk. In addition, CSR can minimize the 
damage due to bad news. A good image built using 
CSR activities can minimize information asymmetry 
and uncertainty of company operations. Managers can 
decide to take an investment policy in CSR to cover the 
possible risk of bankruptcy. Several studies have 
proven the beneficial impact of corporate involvement 
on CSR, reducing idiosyncratic risk [14]. Better CSR 
performance means companies can manage their 
resources and risks, which positively signals 
stakeholders, reducing company risk [18]. 
Environmental and social responsibility efforts in 
improving the company's ability to manage and reduce 
risks include brand damage, reputation, boycotts, 
mismanagement, and government fines [14]. CSR can 
reduce the risk of losing stakeholder support and 
reduce market uncertainty and reduce disruption, loss, 
or damage to profitability, and reduce the impact of 
idiosyncratic risk. 
H1: CSR harms idiosyncratic risk. 
 
2.3. Corporate Governance, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, and Idiosyncratic Risk 
In Indonesia, corporate governance has a legal 
regulation as stipulated in the Decree of the Minister of 
State for SOEs Number: PER-01 / MBU / 2011. 
Governance is a system used by companies to provide 
rights and responsibilities to all company stakeholders. 
There are several components in corporate governance 
in the government regulations, including ownership 
and the board of commissioners. According to The 
Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), 
Indonesia had the lowest Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG) implementation in BUMN and private 
companies throughout 2018. In addition, the keys to 
realizing GCG are ethics, governance, and law 
enforcement. Corporate governance (CG) is a set of 
mechanisms that can protect companies from corporate 
takeovers. Good governance helps companies to reduce 
cost variability, including agency conflicts. 
Institutional ownership is the proportion of share 
ownership by institutional investors to outstanding 
shares. These institutional investors include companies, 
banks, foundations, investment companies, insurance 
companies, and pension funds. Institutional investors 
influence the company's decision-making because of 
their nature as the majority shareholder. Institutional 
ownership has an essential meaning in the management 
of supervision because it will encourage more optimal 
supervision. From an active monitoring point of view, 
institutional investors actively monitor the company's 
business, minimize information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts [19], and reduce corporate risk in two ways. 
First, institutional investors apply very high managerial 
skills, professional knowledge, and voice rights to 
influence managers in making business decisions, 
increase efficiency, and regulate corporate governance. 
Second, institutional investors can provide funds by 
using their relationships to help funding sources in 
developing companies [20]. Institutional ownership can 
minimize agency problems between managers and 
shareholders. 
The positive impact of CSR on financial 
performance can be facilitated by setting up 
appropriate governance mechanisms to make company 
operations more effective. Institutional investors can 
influence corporate behavior through several 
mechanisms. First, they can advise management on 
steps and give support to achieve goals. Second, they 
can provide additional capital to implement specific 
plans such as CSR. Third, they can use voting rights to 
support or oppose the manager's plan. This mechanism 
can be used to reduce company risk. In addition, 
institutional investors (mutual funds, hedge funds, 
pension funds, or banks) are an essential group of 
investors in a company who can become supervisory 
managers. They tend to put considerable pressure on 
management to create wealth for investors so that 
managers pay much attention to meeting the financial 
targets set by investors [7], and through their 
interactions, institutional investors can correct their 
own cognitive biases [6]. Institutional investors have 
more significant incentives and efficiency in the 
company information-gathering process, so company 
supervision is more effective and further reduces the 
asymmetry of company information. 
The second CG component in this study is the board 
of commissioners, which plays a vital role in the 
company, especially in implementing GCG. The board 
of commissioners oversees the board of directors' 
performance work to maximize the company's value. 
The existence of a board of commissioners in Indonesia 
has been regulated by the Indonesia Stock Exchange, 
which states that in the context of implementing GCG, 
a company must have at least one independent 
commissioner. An independent commissioner is a 
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member of the board of commissioners who come from 
outside the issuer or public company, does not have 
shares, has no affiliation with the board of directors or 
other members of the board of commissioners or 
controlling shareholder, and does not have business 
relations with the public company. According to POJK 
Article 20 Number 33 of 2014 concerning the board of 
directors and commissioners of issuers or public 
companies, the board of commissioners consists of 
more than two boards of commissioners. Meanwhile, 
independent commissioners are at least 30% of the total 
commissioners elected through the previous GMS. 
Independent commissioners cannot take sides, 
prioritize their benefits in carrying out their duties, and 
prioritize common interests by company goals and 
strategies. 
The existence of independent commissioners is 
hoped to bring tighter supervision on the board of 
directors. The primary purpose of an independent 
commissioner is to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders and oversee company management [6]. 
This function is to avoid an attitude of exploitation (the 
use of control to maximize one's wealth through the 
wealth of other parties) of majority shareholders 
against minority shareholders. Independent 
commissioners cannot take sides, prioritize their 
benefits in carrying out their duties, and prioritize 
company goals and strategies [6]. The company's 
independent commissioners provide increased 
oversight of managerial decisions and activities. Thus, 
the independent commissioner has a role in monitoring 
all the behavior of directors. If the independent 
commissioners can carry out their duties effectively, 
then there will be no disadvantaged parties because the 
decision-making is done by taking into account the 
interests of all parties so that the company can 
implement GCG appropriately. The higher proportion 
of independent commissioners, the better the 
implementation of GCG to reduce agency conflicts 
between the principal and the agent, resulting in an 
effective CSR implementation. A high proportion of 
independent commissioners will monitor directors who 
are selfish to minimize agency costs. It can increase 
investor confidence in the company because investors 
have a good perception of the company. After all, the 
company has implemented GCG appropriately. 
Consequently, the stock price will increase, which will 
increase the market value of the company's assets with 
a lower risk level. Institutional investors and 
independent commissioners want CSR not to become 
an unprofitable investment tool to reduce the 
idiosyncratic risk. 
H2: Good corporate governance strengthens the 
negative impact of CSR on idiosyncratic risk. 
 
3. Research Methods 
The research data criteria were as follows: first, the 
company had to be listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2016-2019. Second, the company had to 
disclose CSR activities in the annual report in total and 
per environmental dimension. Third, all necessary data 
for the control variables were available. Based on these 
criteria, the research sample was 551 firm years. The 
hypothesis was be tested by regressing all samples 
obtained. 
The dependent variable in this study was an 
idiosyncratic risk. This risk was a particular risk in 
certain investments and could be minimized or even 
eliminated by having a well-diversified portfolio. In 
this study, the idiosyncratic risk was measured using 
the idiosyncratic proxy volatility (IVOL). 
  (1) 
where  is the average rate of return on individual 
stocks in the portfolio is the average market rate of 
return,  is the risk-free rate of return,  is the 
residual error? Stock return can be calculated using 
historical data on its daily stock price from January 1, 
2016, to December 31, 2019. The formula is used to 
find out the value of stock returns: 
    (2) 
 is the closing price for period t (current 
period) and  is the closing price for period t-1 
(previous period). The rate of market increase can be 
calculated using the daily composite stock price index 
(IHSG) from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2019. 
The formula for calculating the market index value is 
as follows: 
    (3) 
where is the IHSG population during t, and 
is the IHSG population during t-1. A residual 
error was obtained from the equation model, 
measuring the stock's average idiosyncratic risk 
volatility (IVOL). IVOL is measured as follows: 
    (4) 
Idiosyncratic risk volatility was derived from the 
standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk. 
The independent variable was CSR, which was 
collected from the annual report. The instrument used 
was the GRI index, which had been adjusted to the 
conditions in Indonesia. CSR analysis was carried out 
using content analysis, where the disclosure was 
calculated using the CSR disclosure ratio. The 
moderating variable in this study was institutional 
ownership as a form of good corporate governance. 
The first control variable was TobinsQ, the ratio 
between the market capitalization value and its book 
value. The second variable was cash holding (CASH) 
which was conducted by looking at the logarithmic 
value of total cash. The third variable was company 
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size (SIZE) which was calculated using total assets. 
The fourth variable was the long-term debt ratio 
(LEV_LT). The fifth variable was earning per share 
(EPS). This study used PLS regression analysis in 
analyzing CSR. The regression model to test the first 
hypothesis was as follows: 
  (5) 
where  is the idiosyncratic risk in year t + 1, 
 is the Total Corporate Social Responsibility 
in year t,  is the Environmental Corporate 
Social Responsibility in year t, is the 
Tobins_Q, Cash, EPS, Size, and Lev_LT in year t, and 
is the specific error of the company.  
The model includes the company-level control 
variable and the constant effect of industry and year. 
This study tested the hypothesis on the effect of 
moderation of the institutional ownership factor and the 
independent commissioners by introducing the PLS 
regression model as follows: 
  (6) 
  (7) 
where  is the idiosyncratic risk in year t + 1, 
 is the Total Corporate Social Responsibility 
in year t,  is the Environmental Corporate 
Social Responsibility in year t,  is the institutional 
ownership in year t,  is the independent 
commissioner in year t is Tobins_Q, Cash, 
EPS, Size, and Lev_LT in year t, and is the specific 
error of the company. 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
sample. In the sample, idiosyncratic risk has a mean of 
0.078 and a maximum of 0.430. The average CSRTot 
performance is 34.90%, the CSRTot is at least 2.40%. 
Meanwhile, CSR for the environmental dimension has 
an average of 32.87%. The IO variable shows how 
many companies have institutional shares, and the table 
below shows an average of 0.643 and a maximum of 
0.979. The independent commissioner variable (IDK) 
has a minimum value of 0.200 or 20%, indicating that 
Indonesia's companies have not fulfilled the minimum 
30% regulation. 
 
Table 1 Statistical description (Author’s calculations) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
CSRTot 0.024 0.683 0.349 0.121 
CSREnv 0.000 1.000 0.375 0.271 
Tobins_Q 0.304 91.368 1.769 4.323 
Cash 0.001 0.775 0.094 0.099 
EPS -646.636 4050.266 138.750 416.848 
Size 24.611 33.474 28.733 1.606 
Lev_LT 0.001 2.178 0.178 0.191 
IVOL 0.005 0.430 0.078 0.055 
IO 0.000 0.979 0.643 0.219 
CSRTot_IO 0.000 0.545 0.224 0.110 
CSREnv_IO 0.000 0.924 0.240 0.202 
IDK 0.200 0.800 0.389 0.109 
CSRTot_IDK 0.010 0.470 0.141 0.062 
CSREnv_IDK 0.000 0.830 0.153 0.127 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results from 
equations (1), (2), and (3). The model chosen is the 
fixed effect model because the results of the chow test 
and the Hausman test show that the chi-square 
probability is less than 0.05. All model tests use PLS 
linear regression to analyze corporate responsibility for 
idiosyncratic risk. The statistical results show that CSR, 
both in total and environmental, hurts idiosyncratic 
risk. In detail, in models (1), (2), and (3), the CSRTot 
coefficient is not significant for IVOL. In models (1) 
and (2), the CSREnv coefficient is negative and 
significant at the five percent level. In model (3), the 
CSREnv coefficient is negative and significant at the 
ten percent level. That is, companies with higher social 
responsibility performance will have a lower 
idiosyncratic risk and vice versa. The control variable, 
size, has a negative effect with significance at the one 
percent level. Tobin's and cash have a positive and 
insignificant effect on risk. Lev_LT has a significant 
positive effect on idiosyncratic risk with a significance 
value of one percent. Earnings per share have no 
significant positive effect on idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Table 2 Regression result (Authors’ calculations based on secondary 
data) 
Variable 
   
CSRTot -0.748 -0.728 -0.570 
CSREnv -0.021** -0.029** -0.084* 
Tobins_Q -0.587 -0.715 -0.845 
Cash -0.149 -0.120 -0.150 
EPS 0.44 0.339 0.449 
Size -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
Lev_LT 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
IO - -0.042** - 
CSRTot*IO - -0.006*** - 
CSREnv*IO - -0.038** - 
IDK - - -0.057* 
CSRTot*IDK - - -0.145 
CSREnv*IDK - - -0.067* 
Ob 551 551 551 
F (Stat) 17.055*** 18.023*** 17.034*** 
Adj R2 0.065 0.074 0.061 
***significant 1% 
**significant 5% 
* significant 10% 
 
Furthermore, to confirm the second hypothesis, the 
interaction of corporate governance is included to test 
the impact of institutional ownership and independent 
commissioners as a form of monitoring mechanism and 
place it as a moderating variable. In model (2), IO, 
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CSRTot*IO, and CSREnv*IO have a negative and 
significant effect on IVOL. Institutional ownership 
makes the negative effect of total CSR and the 
environmental dimension on idiosyncratic risk even 
stronger. In model (3), IDK and CSREnv*IDK have a 
negative and significant effect on IVOL. In model (3), 
it is also seen that the CSRTot*IDK coefficient has no 
significant effect on IVOL. The existence of 
independent commissioners makes the negative impact 
of environmental CSR on idiosyncratic risk even 
stronger. 
The empirical results of this study support the 
results of Liu & Lu's research [21], which documented 
that CSR performance is negatively related to company 
risk because these activities can build a reputation and 
enable companies to manage essential resources well. 
Investing in CSR activities is a risk management 
strategy that can protect cash flows and ultimately 
reduce corporate risk. CSR disclosure can reduce 
information asymmetry and reduce information 
uncertainty faced by financial analysts so that profit 
forecasts can be better determined, in addition to 
reducing the cost of equity [22]. CSR activities can 
increase capital spending to reduce pollution and waste, 
increase energy efficiency, and meet regulatory 
requirements. This means that the implementation of 
pollution reduction and energy efficiency can increase 
company financing. CSR is considered an investment 
strategy. Investors must be careful about spending their 
funding sources in the form of CSR because it can 
increase default risk [14]. To achieve its goals, 
companies must consider various stakeholders so that 
CSR can help reduce the risk of losing support from 
stakeholders [14]. 
Consistent with developing the idiosyncratic risk 
reduction hypothesis, empirical testing has shown that 
CSR and the environment negatively affect 
idiosyncratic risk. When viewed in more detail, Table 2 
shows that social responsibility in the environmental 
dimension can significantly reduce idiosyncratic risk in 
companies in Indonesia. Meanwhile, total social 
responsibility is not significant. The results showed that 
environmental, social responsibility could reduce 
idiosyncratic risk than total social responsibility. 
Social responsibility in the environmental 
dimension is significant for companies, especially 
manufacturing companies. Environmental protection is 
primarily the responsibility of the government. When a 
company expresses its concern and involvement in 
environmental protection through an environmental 
social responsibility scheme, stakeholders are satisfied 
so that the environmental category of social 
responsibility helps a lot in building the company's 
reputation. The significant results indicate that social 
responsibility in the environmental dimension makes 
the market more sensitive to the company. The 
environmental dimension has become one of the most 
significant interests in market attitudes towards 
corporate responsibility. Investors actively use 
corporate responsibility information on the 
environmental dimension in investment decisions [23]. 
Companies benefit from the environmental dimension 
of social responsibility, namely a reduction in the cost 
of equity. Companies committed to active 
environmental engagement and do not withhold 
negative news related to environmental policies are 
more likely to gain market confidence, reducing the 
level of risk between companies and stakeholders [23]. 
In addition, the study results indicate that total CSR is 
an insignificant category of social responsibility. One 
of the reasons is that contributions and donations to the 
community or outside the environment have become 
the custom or norm. CSR activities related to the total 
category do not help build the company's reputation 
because other companies are also active contributors. 
Companies can reduce risks by disclosing CSR as a 
concern for balancing economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions. CSR activities and 
disclosures are used to gain legitimacy, reputation, 
trust, and support from stakeholders. In the end, 
investors will judge that all of this will provide stability 
in performance, sustainability and reduce risks in the 
future. 
The results showed that the moderating variable of 
institutional ownership significantly strengthened the 
negative effect of total CSR and environmental 
dimensions on idiosyncratic risk. The higher the 
institutional ownership, the stronger the negative effect 
of CSR on idiosyncratic risk. Proving that institutional 
ownership is essential in managing supervision because 
it encourages an increase in more optimal supervision 
[24]. From an active monitoring point of view, 
institutional investors actively monitor the company's 
business, minimize information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts, and reduce corporate risk. Institutional 
investors reduce market information asymmetry. 
Institutional investors apply a very high level of 
managerial skills, professional knowledge, and voting 
rights to influence managers in making business 
decisions, increasing efficiency, and providing 
direction on corporate governance. In addition, 
institutional investors can provide funds by using their 
relationships to help funding sources in developing the 
company. The funds are used for investment in CSR, 
which can later reduce idiosyncratic risk. 
The second moderating variable is independent 
commissioners. The results showed that the 
independent commissioner significantly strengthened 
the effect of CSR on the environmental dimension. 
Meanwhile, the independent commissioner 
insignificantly strengthened the effect of total CSR on 
idiosyncratic risk. An independent commissioner is not 
allowed to take sides and prioritize his benefit in 
carrying out his duties and must prioritize common 
interests by the goals and strategies of the company. In 
addition, the company's independent commissioners 
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provide increased oversight of managerial decisions 
and activities. The independent commissioner has a 
role in monitoring all the behavior of the board of 
directors. 
The higher institutional ownership and independent 
commissioners, the better the GCG implementation to 
reduce agency conflicts between principals and agents, 
and it can be used in effective CSR implementation. 
Independent commissioners can monitor directors' 
selfish actions to minimize agency costs and increase 
investor confidence in a company. In addition, 
investors perceive the company to be good because the 
company has implemented GCG properly. Thus, the 
company's stock price will increase, which will 
increase the company's assets' market value and avoid 
idiosyncratic risk. Institutional investors and 
independent commissioners want CSR not to become 
an unprofitable investment tool to reduce the 
idiosyncratic risk. 
Tobin's cash and size control variables hurt 
idiosyncratic risk. Meanwhile, Lev_LT and earnings 
per share have a positive influence on idiosyncratic 
risk. Large companies could provide reports for 
internal purposes [25]. The information is also used as 
material for information purposes to external parties, so 
there is no need to pay additional costs. The bigger the 
company, the more information it will disclose. The 
result is a lower information asymmetry resulting in the 
decreasing of idiosyncratic risk. 
The research results showed that the more long-term 
debt, the higher the idiosyncratic risk. When managers 
have strong confidence in the company's prospects, 
they can use more debt to signal investors to improve 
their performance [26]. However, companies that rely 
on external parties such as creditors to finance their 
operations have a greater risk than companies that use 
more of their own internally generated funds. This is 
because funding originating from debt can help a 
company finance its business activities and create an 
obligation to pay within a certain period, which 
increases the difficulty of paying a more significant 
proportion of debt than using its capital. Based on 
agency theory, managers as agents have received a 
delegation of authority from shareholders to coordinate 
activities within the company. The most crucial role of 
shareholders is monitoring and controlling the work 
and the managers' economic decision-making. This is 
done to reduce the risk that shareholders must bear as 
owners of the company. Therefore, shareholders will 
also assess how management manages the company's 
internal activities related to investment and funding, in 
which the policies issued by management can be said 
to determine how much risk is borne by shareholders. 
The funding decision is related to the manager's 
policy in determining the right proportion between the 
amount of debt and the amount of capital in the 
company to maximize firm value. Securities associated 
with idiosyncratic risk are often found to come from 
companies with high levels of advantage and high 
stock turnover. Long-term advantage has a positive and 
significant effect on idiosyncratic risk, which means 
that the higher its long-term debt proportion, the 
idiosyncratic risk will also increase. Because the use of 
debt itself poses a risk, a high advantage creates a high 
idiosyncratic risk. This indicates that the higher the 
proportion of debt to equity in the company's capital 
structure, the higher the idiosyncratic risk that 
shareholders must bear. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study highlighted CSR related to idiosyncratic 
risk by involving company-monitoring mechanisms to 
strengthen its relationship. For the robustness test, CSR 
is measured using two kinds of proxies: CSR total and 
environment. Consistent with developing the 
idiosyncratic risk reduction hypothesis, empirical 
testing has shown that CSR hurts idiosyncratic risk. 
CSR in the environmental dimension can significantly 
reduce idiosyncratic risk in companies in Indonesia in a 
more detailed test. Meanwhile, total CSR is not 
significant. The results showed that environmental CSR 
is more able to reduce idiosyncratic risk than total CSR. 
The interaction of corporate governance was 
included to test the impact of institutional ownership 
and independent commissioners as a monitoring 
mechanism and place it as a moderating variable to 
confirm the second hypothesis. The result was that 
institutional ownership makes the negative impact of 
CSR, both total and environmental, on idiosyncratic risk 
getting stronger. Meanwhile, the independent 
commissioners make the negative impact of 
environmental CSR on idiosyncratic risk stronger. 
Tobin's control variables, cash, and size hurt 
idiosyncratic risk. Meanwhile, Lev_LT and earnings per 
share have a positive influence on idiosyncratic risk. 
Social and environmental performance is measured 
based on CSR disclosure in the annual report because it 
is assumed that the more activities carried out, the wider 
the disclosure will be. The results showed support for 
the theory of risk management and signaling. The better 
the CSR performance means that the company can 
manage its resources and risks and give a positive signal 
to stakeholders to reduce idiosyncratic risk. This study 
also enriches corporate governance in institutional 
ownership and independent commissioners to monitor 
social responsibility activities. 
The practical contribution of the research is that it 
can provide knowledge to capital market participants in 
assessing the company's risk to avoid losses. The 
findings that are of concern to investors are monitoring 
mechanisms that support corporate governance. 
Companies that have monitors within the company but 
use external parties will make it easier for the company 
to be more optimal in monitoring because it interacts 
directly with the company board, or the idiosyncratic 
risk can be reduced. 
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The limitations of this study are that it has not used a 
non-financial approach and the use of state economic 
factors. It is hoped that these two factors will improve 
research on corporate governance in Indonesia for 
further research. 
This paper highlighted CSR issues in Indonesia, and 
its findings have implications for regulators and 
company management. Regulators are expected to set 
standards that encourage companies to carry out CSR 
more integrated with their primary business. It means 
that CSR activities must solve problems caused by the 
company, not just creating a good image. This study 
used a research sample for all stocks listed on the IDX. 
In the future, it can be considered to use a sharia-based 
stock sample related to the impact of CSR on 
idiosyncratic risk. The results of this study have not 
used risk with market size as a strong comparison. In 
addition, this study does not include a pyramid structure 
of majority ownership, so the measurements used on 
moderating variables, especially the independent board, 
ignore it. Further research can be related to the 
relationship between independent boards and the 
dominance of controlling shareholders in the company 
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